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LEGISLATION, & REGULATIONS AFFECTING
THE NATURAL RESOURCES INDUSTRIES

Thomas A. Daily

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS—A REVIEW OF CASES, LEGISLATION, AND
REGULATIONS AFFECTING THE NATURAL RESOURCES INDUSTRIES
By Thomas A. Daily1

El ev en th Circ u it Ru les that

EPA Must Reg ul at e Fra c Tr ea tm en ts .

The Safe Water Drinking Act (“SWDA”)2 requires the Environmental Protection Agency to
promulgate regulations that set forth minimum requirements for state administered programs
regulating underground injection o f fluids. Among those minimum requirements is the requirement
that the state must prohibit “any underground injection” unless authorized by permit or rule. EPA
had previously ruled, however, that hydraulic fracturing o f oil and gas wells did not constitute
“underground injection o f fluids” within the meaning o f SWDA.
Relying upon this EPA determination, Alabama submitted an underground injection control
program which did not deal with hydraulic fracturing. Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation,
Inc. (“LEA F’) petitioned EPA to withdraw its approval o f Alabama’s program because that program
did not regulate hydraulic fracturing o f certain methane gas wells. EPA, consistent with its prior
definition o f “underground injection,” denied LEAF’S petition.
LEAF then perfected a direct appeal to the United States Court o f Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit.3 The Court of Appeals ordered EPA to grant LEAF’S petition and withdraw its approval of
Alabama’s underground injection control program. The appeals court found that the phrase “any
underground injection” was unambiguous, and that EPA was without authority to make an exception,

1M em ber, Daily & Woods, P.L.L.C., 623 Garrison, Suite 600, Fort Smith, AR 72901
242 U.S.C. §§300h-300h-8.
3Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation. Inc, v. EPA. 118 F.3d 1467 (1 1th Cir. 1997).

regardless of how much sense the exception might have made.
Presently this decision is only binding in the Eleventh Circuit, but, barring a rehearing in banc
or appeal to the Supreme Court, it will stand. If EPA acquiesces in the decision EPA will begin
requiring all states to regulate well completions which include hydraulic fracturing or acid treatments.
The impact of all of this upon the natural resources industries cannot be accurately predicted at this
time, but it can’t be good. Perhaps the best solution would be to persuade Congress to grant specific
exemptions from SDWA for these de minimus injections, particularly when they occur thousands of
feet below fresh water aquifers.

Te n t h Circu it Rules th at Fe de ra l Reserva tion o f Co a l in La n d
Paten t o f Indi a n Triba l La n ds Rese rv ed Co al be d M e t ha ne
The Southern Ute Indian Tribe is the successor in interest to the United States under
Colorado lands patented with reservation to the United States of “all coal.” These lands contain
substantial production o f coalbed methane gas. The Southern Ute Tribe sued Amoco and other
producers for trespass, among other causes of action, for producing this gas without a lease from the
Tribe. The producers had obtained leases from the owners o f the oil and gas, as opposed to coal.
The case was certified as a class action defense, with Amoco acting as the designated class
representative. The District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants.4 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.5 The Appeals Court appeared persuaded that since coalbed
methane was produced by the coalification process, it is simply a gaseous form o f coal and thus had
to fall within the reservation of “all coal.” Also important was a rule o f construction that reservations

4874 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Colo. 1995).
5Southem Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Co., 119 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 1997).
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in favor o f the Federal Government are to be broadly construed. This is contrary to the rule that
reservations by private grantors are construed narrowly.
The limited authority on this interesting question when it involved private parties is split.
Courts in Alabama6 and Pennsylvania7 have sided with the coal owner, while the Montana Court8 held
for the gas owner. However, the Tenth Circuit Court expressed little interest in these cases, holding
instead that the matter before it was one o f federal law.
This case is disturbing.

In 1981, the Solicitor o f the Department o f the Interior had

promulgated an opinion entitled Ownership o f and Right to Extract Coalbed Gas in Federal Coal
Deposits9 in which the Solicitor construed the meaning o f “coal” in the 1909 and 1910 Acts which
enabled the patents and concluded that “a reservation o f 'coal' does not include coalbed gas.”10
Amoco and others had obviously relied upon this Solicitor's opinion in concluding that coalbed
methane was the property o f the owner o f the gas, rather than the coal owner. The Tenth Circuit
Court concluded that the Solicitor's opinion was not binding because it was apparently issued without

6 NCNB Texas N at’l Bank, N .A. v. W est. 631 So. 2d 212 (Ala. 1993) (coal owner has
ownership rights o f CBM contained in coal and gas owner has rights to any CBM which has
migrated away from the coal reservoir); Vines v. McKenzie Methane Corp., 619 So. 2d 1305
(Ala. 1993) (ownership o f CBM was included in grant o f “all coal”); Rayburn v. USX Corp., No.
85-G-2661-W, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6920 (N.D. Ala. Jul. 28, 1987) (coal owner, USX, is
owner o f right to explore for and to extract occluded CBM where grantor o f deed retained only
oil and gas rights).
CBM)

7United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge. 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983) (coal owner has right to

8Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 898 P.2d 680 (Mont. 1995) (right to extract
CBM is with holder o f gas exploration rights).
988 Interior Dec. 538 (1981).
10Id. at 549.
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notice to the tribes whose interests were affected. The real purpose o f the Interior Solicitor's opinion
was to enable the government to stake claim to coalbed methane under lands where the Government
owned gas and someone else owned coal. Now, presumably, the government or the tribes may argue
the issue either way, depending upon their interests in the particular case.
The lands in question underlay an Indian reservation in Colorado, so the problem seems
remote. Unfortunately, it is not. Many very similar patents cover lands in Eastern Oklahoma where
there has already been some coalbed methane production. Oklahoma is within the Tenth Circuit, so,
presumably, those lands will be affected.
The Tenth Circuit Court o f Appeals recently granted a rehearing en banc in the case.

Arka nsa s Supr eme Co u r t Aff irms Cer ti fi cat ion o f Royal ty
Ow n e r s ’ Sui t Aga in st SEECO a s a Cl as s Ac ti o n .
SEECO, Inc. and Arkansas Western Gas Company are related corporate entities. Arkansas
Western, a public utility, purchases gas from SEECO, a producer. One gas purchase contract
between the parties is known as “Contract 59.” Alan Hales and others are royalty owners whose
lands are dedicated to Contract 59. They brought suit against SEECO for allegedly failing to enforce
the contract against Arkansas Western, particularly with respect to its take or pay provisions. The
named plaintiffs sought to proceed as a class. The circuit judge certified the class o f royalty owners
and SEECO appealed.11
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's certification o f the class. This result
is unremarkable given the facts of the case. Indeed, Arkansas' most notorious take or pay case, Klein

11SEECO, Inc. v. Hales. 330 Ark. 4 0 2 ,____ S.W .2d_____(1997).

4

v. Arkoma Production Co.,12 was tried as a class action. However, the court's opinion contains a
detailed recitation o f recent Arkansas decisions regarding class certification that attempts to reconcile
apparently conflicting prior decisions and thus is likely to provide the basis for future decisions on
class certification issues.

Thr ee Ca se s Invo lve All eg ati ons th a t Centra l Po in t
Com pr ess or Sta ti on s Cons titute Priv at e Nu is a nc e .
During 1997, at least three cases were tried which involved noise emitted from central point
compressor stations in N orth Arkansas.

In Neel v. Synoground13 the issue was whether the

Chancellor should rescind the sale o f a home and surrounding three acres because o f an alleged
misrepresentation. The plaintiffs alleged that they were looking for a quiet home in the country and
that Mrs. Synoground had represented to them that there was no noise problem o f which she was
aware. Also, the Synogrounds had answered “no” to the following question on a written property
disclosure form used in connection with the transaction: “Are there any neighborhood noise problems
or other nuisances that would not be normal for this type o f property?”
The plaintiffs testified that immediately after moving into the home they discovered an
“unbearable” roaring noise. Upon investigation they found its source, a central point compressor
station located about 1,500 feet from the home. The Chancellor visited the site three times, twice
alone. He concluded that the noise level at the home constituted, at worst, “an almost imperceptible
hum.” Thus, the complaint was dismissed with prejudice.
Three homeowners a few miles away who live quite close to another central point compressor

1273 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 1996).
13Sebastian County Chancery Court Case No. E-96-266-G (II) (Greenwood District).
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fared somewhat better in a jury trial in United States District Court.14 The case involved a site
containing two extremely large compressors which had been installed after the plaintiffs' homes had
been built. One plaintiff couple's home was only about 300 feet away from the site, while others were
somewhat farther away. The operator’s testimony was that it had spent thousands o f dollars muffling
the noise but that, because o f large fans required by the compressors, it was impossible to silence it
altogether. The jury held that the compressor station constituted a nuisance as to three plaintiff
couples. It awarded $55,000.00 to the couple living 300 feet away and $7,500.00 and $8,000.00,
respectively, to two other couples living about one-half mile away. The jury awarded no damages
to two other couples who live slightly farther away. No appeal was taken.
A jury returned a defense verdict in a case tried in Sebastian County Circuit Court which was
affirmed by the Arkansas Court o f Appeals in an unpublished opinion.15 The facts were very similar
to those in Cantrell v. Reynolds but the noise may not have been as great as at those plaintiffs' homes.
The jury instructions given in Cantrell v. Reynolds and Fitzgerald v. Southwestern Energy are
very similar. The material instructions given in Cantrell v. Reynolds are as follows:
Each o f the plaintiffs seek to recover damages from the defendant on the theory that
the noise produced by defendant's compressor(s) constitutes a nuisance and that as
a result o f the nuisance, the value o f their property has been permanently diminished.
In order to prove their case, each plaintiff has the burden o f proving each o f the
following three (3) essential propositions by a preponderance o f the evidence:
First, that the compressor(s) operated by the defendant constitutes a nuisance;

14Cantrell. et al v. Reynolds Metals Company, U.S.D.C. Civil Case No. 96-2067
(W .D.Ark).
15Roger Fitzgerald, et al v. Southwestern Energy Production Company, Case No.
CA97-63 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997).
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Second, that the nuisance is permanent; and
Third, that the operation of the compressor(s) has resulted in a permanent diminution
in the fair market value o f the plaintiffs' property.
W hether each o f these three (3) essential propositions has been proven by a
preponderance o f the evidence is for you to determine.

An owner of an interest in land— including the lessee o f a mineral interest— may use
the property as long as the use does not unlawfully or unreasonably interfere with
others. It is only the unreasonable use or conduct which results in unwarranted
interference that constitutes a nuisance.
You are instructed that, under Arkansas law, a nuisance is defined as conduct by one
landowner, or lessee, which unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment o f the
lands o f another. A nuisance includes conduct on property which disturbs the
peaceful, quiet, and undisturbed use and enjoyment o f nearby property, but only
where the resulting injury of nearby property and residents is certain, substantial, and
beyond speculation and conjecture.
The mere diminution in value is not sufficient to establish a nuisance.

In determining whether any alleged nuisance is permanent in character, you should
consider all o f the evidence, including but not limited to:
the nature o f the alleged nuisance;
the duration o f the alleged nuisance from its inception down to the
present time;
whether the alleged nuisance is reasonably certain to continue and, if
so, for how long.

An owner of an interest in land— including the lessee o f a mineral interest— may use
leased property so long as the use does not unlawfully or unreasonably interfere with
others.
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You are instructed that the defendant is the lessee o f the mineral interests underlying
plaintiffs' property as well as the lessee o f other mineral interests in the Gragg Field
area. Accordingly, as lessee, defendant has an interest in the land and has the right
to use the property of the plaintiffs and others in any manner reasonably necessary to
perform the obligations o f defendant's leases. This includes the right and obligation
to explore, develop, and transport minerals under the land— including natural
gas— and to construct and operate structures and facilities for the purpose o f
producing and marketing gas, including construction and operation o f structures or
facilities designed for the compression o f natural gas.
Whether the defendant's operations unreasonably interfere with the use and enjoyment
o f the lands o f another is for you to decide.

If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that the operation o f the
compressor(s) constitutes a nuisance, and that the damage to the plaintiffs' property,
if any, is permanent, then your verdict should be for an amount equal to the
difference, if any, in the fair market value o f plaintiffs' property immediately before
and immediately after the commencement o f the operation o f the compressor(s), to
the extent such difference was proximately caused by the operation o f said
compressor(s).

When I use the expression “fair market value,” I mean the price that the plaintiffs'
property would bring on the open market in a sale between a seller who is willing to
sell and a buyer who is willing and able to buy after a reasonable opportunity for
negotiations.

In determining the “fair market value” o f plaintiffs' property, you are to consider the
highest and best use o f the land. However, the uses considered in fixing value must
be so reasonably probable as to have an effect upon the market value o f the land.
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AOGC and PSC Disput e Juri sd ic ti on ov er “Prod uc ti on ” Fa c i l i t i e s .
The Arkansas Natural Gas Pipeline Act o f 197116 requires the Arkansas Public Service
Commission (PSC) to regulate natural gas “gathering” in non-rural areas. Recently, the PSC's staff
has adopted the position that such “gathering,” at least in some instances, includes pipelines located
behind the meter which is at the point where custody o f the gas is transferred to a purchaser or
transporter. Thus, PSC is now seeking to regulate activities o f producers, in addition to transporters.
Producers argue that these upstream facilities are “production facilities” and exempt from PSC
regulation.

The Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission (AOGC) historically has thought it had

jurisdiction over all phases of production o f gas upstream from the transfer meter,17 although only as
a result of PSC's assertion o f additional jurisdiction has AOGC sought to actively regulate pipelines
and equipment used upstream from this meter.
On August 11, 1997, and August 13, 1997, PSC filed motions for show cause orders against
Stephens Production Company18 and Sonat Exploration Company19 because, according to PSC, both
were engaged in “gathering” gas pursuant to PSC jurisdiction. The facilities in question are pipelines
connecting the wellheads o f various wells (several in the city limits o f Fort Smith) to separators,
dehydrators and compressors, as well as to the custody transfer meter.
After hearings before the PSC, PSC ordered the parties to request the United States
D epartm ent o f Transportation (DOT) for an opinion as to whether DOT would consider PSC to

16A.C.A. §23-15-201-216.
17Pursuant to Act 105 o f 1939 (A.C.A. §15-71-101 et seq.).
18PSC docket No. 97-315-U.
19PSC docket No. 97-321-U.
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regulate such facilities in order to ensure DOT certification o f PSC's pipeline safety plan under
Section 5 o f the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act o f 1968. DOT has yet to respond.
This is an important and complex issue. Significant growth o f Fort Smith and other Western
Arkansas communities has caused the steady urban and suburban expansion into areas o f gas
production. New discoveries o f gas have also recently been made in urban areas. Producers are
concerned that overlapping agency jurisdiction will lead to unjustified red tape which will increase
costs without benefits and, at worst, may lead to conflicting regulations. PSC appears proud o f its
new “jurisdiction” and unwilling to give it up. The solution is probably legislative, but the next
regular session isn't until 1999, and a special session is highly unlikely, given the mutual dislike
between the Governor and the Legislature.

Brine Case Res olves

Limit atio ns Iss ue ; Raises Many Ot h e r s .

Great Lakes Chemical Corporation20 produces Jurassic age salt water (brine) from the
Reynolds Aquifer o f the Smackover Limestone Formation underlying Southern Union County,
Arkansas. Albemarle Corporation, Great Lakes' principal domestic competitor conducts a similar
operation in neighboring Columbia County.

The brine produced from these wells contains

commercially valuable concentrations of bromine, in the form o f dissolved bromide salts. W ater from
the production wells is piped to bromine extraction plants where elemental bromine is removed, using
a process which involves infusing hot brine with steam containing chlorine. Both companies then
either sell the elemental bromine or use it to manufacture other products which the companies

20and its subsidiary, Arkansas Chemicals, Inc.
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market.21 After the brine is processed to remove bromine, it is transported to disposal wells where
it is reinjected back into the Smackover formation.22 This combination o f production and reinjection
acts as a pressure maintenance system which has the effect o f gradually sweeping high bromine brine
away from injection wells toward production wells. Ultimately, “break through” will occur, and
production wells will experience declines in bromide concentration, signaling the fact that they have
begun to produce some o f the reinjected “tail-brine.” Since fluids move within the reservoir toward
areas o f relatively lower pressure all injected brine does not flow directly from injection wells toward
production wells.

Moreover, some o f the brine which flows to production wells comes from

directions other than that o f the injection wells. Finally, the Smackover Formation is a geologically
complex morass o f interconnected porosity bars which are impossible to correlate over a large area.
These operations cover many thousand acres. While brine producers have long attempted to
obtain leases authorizing their activities, some landowners simply refuse to lease. Is a brine producer
liable to such an unleased owner on a theory such as trespass?
In 1979 the Arkansas Legislature enacted A.C.A. §15-76-301 et. seq., authorizing the AOGC
to form brine production units and integrate the interests o f unleased owners therein. These units are
required to contain at least 1,280 acres, underlain by a common aquifer. The brine producer is
jurisdictionally required to control at least 75% o f the acreage within its proposed unit.
This statute went virtually unused23 until 1995 when Great Lakes, realizing a need to expand

21These products include flame retardant additives for plastics, agricultural pesticides,
swimming pool w ater purifiers, photographic chemicals and pharmaceutical chemicals.
22Such reinjection is required by both EPA and AOGC.
23Albemarle's predecessor, Ethyl Corporation, did form two early brine units but neither
involved injection wells.
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its brine operations, began to unitize. Ultimately three units were formed,24 over the opposition o f
Deltic Farm & Timber Co., Inc., then a subsidiary o f Murphy Oil Corporation. Deltic owned several
thousand acres which were leased to Great Lakes as well as several thousand unleased acres. Deltic
challenged all three unitization orders in petitions for review filed in Union County Circuit court
contending, among other things, that the unitization statute was unconstitutional. While these
disputes were pending, Deltic sued Great Lakes in United States District Court.25
Deltic's Federal Court complaint alleges trespass and several trespass-equivalents. It also
contained a prayer for cancellation o f existing Deltic-to-Great Lakes leases.26 The District Court
granted Great Lakes' motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the lease-cancellation counts
of the complaint.
Next, Great Lakes moved for partial summary judgment that Deltic's damages were limited
by the Statute o f Limitations27 to those suffered within three years immediately preceding the filing
of its complaint. Deltic claimed that it had just learned o f Great Lakes' alleged violations o f its lands
and that it was entitled to the benefit o f the so-called “discovery rule,” which tolls limitations until
the victim knew or reasonably should have known it was being wronged. The District Court agreed
with Great Lakes. It rejected the idea that the discovery rule should apply and found, alternatively,
that Deltic should have discovered its alleged cause o f action anyway.

24B U l-95 (South Plant Unit); BU2-95 (Central Unit); BU3-95 (West Plant Unit).
25Deltic Farm & Timber Co., Inc. v. Great Lakes Chemical Corporation.
26Deltic's admitted purpose was to reduce Great Lakes' leasehold acreage within its West
Plant Unit and thus prevent Great Lakes from securing the jurisdictionally required 75%.
27A.C.A. §16-56-105.
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Deltic obtained leave o f the Eighth Circuit Court o f Appeals to take an unusual interlocutory
appeal o f the District Court's ruling on limitations. Then the Eighth Circuit Court affirmed the
District Court, holding, as a matter o f law, that Arkansas would not apply the discovery rule in a
mineral trespass case.28
After three more Great Lakes' partial summary judgment motions were granted in part and
denied in part, the case was tried to the District Court, sitting without a jury, in December, 1997. As
o f the submission deadline for this paper, the case remains under advisement, but a decision is
expected soon. An appeal, if not appeal and cross-appeal, is virtually inevitable. A lot o f money is
involved. Also involved are several important issues o f natural resources law:

Does the Owne r o f a M e r e Leaseho
Ha v e a Right to Sue for M ineral

ld In ter es t
Tr e s pa s s ?

In Budd v. Ethyl Corporation29 the Arkansas Supreme Court, citing Osborn v. Arkansas
Territorial Oil Gas Co.,30 refused to permit a brine lease owner to maintain an action for trespass:
We think the chancellor was right in rejecting that contention. Here the issue turns
upon the limited nature o f a lessee's property rights, prior to his attainment o f
production. Quoting again from the Osborn case, supra: “A gas lease, such as is
involved in this case, is a contract granting to the lessee the right to explore the land
and to produce therefrom the gas therein discovered. It is not a present sale or
transfer o f title to the gas, but, on account o f its vagrant nature, the gas does not
become actually owned until actually possessed. As is said in the case o f Williamson
v. Jones. 39 W. Va. 231: 'The title is dependent on finding the gas by the purchaser
in a limited time' and is inchoate.” That thought was echoed in Pasteur v. Niswanger.
226 Ark. 486, 290 S.W.2d 852 (1956): “Our court has held that an oil and gas lease
conveys an interest and easement in land itself, but no title passes until the oil and gas

28Deltic Farm & Timber Co., Inc. v. Great Lakes Chemical Corporation. ____ F.3d
(8th Cir. 1997).
29251 Ark. 639, 474 S.W.2d 411 (1971).
3O103 Ark. 175, 146 S.W. 122 (1912).
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are reduced to possession.”31
Deltic argued, however, that the Arkansas Supreme Court had changed this rule by dicta in
its opinion in Hillard v. Stephens Production Company32 to the effect that the lessee o f natural gas
obtains ownership o f gas in place. That dicta is clearly contrary to all other Arkansas law on this
issue. The District Court has ruled in favor o f Great Lakes, limiting Deltic's claims to lands upon
which it held a fee interest.

To What Extent Do e s the Rule o f Captu re Permit
Cap tu re Fro m and Dis placement
Off of Unleased La n d s ?
Arkansas' first “brine drainage” case was Budd v. Ethyl Corporation.33 Budd had sued Ethyl
for damages he allegedly sustained from Ethyl's production o f brine displaced from his unleased lands.
Budd owned minerals under 240 acres lying adjacent to, but outside of, the boundaries o f Ethyl's
recycling area, which consisted o f production wells surrounded by a circle o f injection wells. Budd
sued Ethyl, asserting that Ethyl's recycling operation was unlawfully pushing bromine-rich brine off
o f his property, thereby causing him injury.
Relying on the rule of capture, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected Budd’s contention that
the displacement o f brine from beneath this tract o f land by Ethyl's recovery process gave rise to a
cause o f action. In response to Budd's argument that he should be compensated for minerals
displaced from underneath this nearby tract o f land, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated:
The complaint describes the appellees' recycling operation in substance as follows:
The appellees have oil-gas-and-mineral leases upon a compact block o f about 16,000

31Budd v. Ethyl Corporation, supra, 251 Ark. at 641-642.
32Hillard v. Stephens Production Co., 276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581 (1982).

33supra.

14

acres o f land. They have a number o f input wells in what is roughly a circle near the
outer edge o f the block. They have a number o f output wells within that circle. The
appellees withdraw salt water from the inner wells, extract therefrom valuable
minerals (one o f which, according to the briefs, is bromine), and then forcibly inject
the salt water into the input wells, which presumably facilitates the further withdrawal
o f salt water from the output wells.
The appellant asserts the invasion o f two separate property interests, which must be
discussed separately.
First, the appellant owns an undivided one thirty-sixth interest in the minerals in 240
acres lying next to, but outside of, the appellees' 16,000-acre block. The appellees do
not have a lease upon the 240 acres in question. The appellant asserts that the
recycling operation is actually draining salt water from the 240 acres and that the
appellees should be made to account to him for his share of the minerals that are being
extracted from the salt water.
That argument is refuted by the law o f capture, which we hold to be applicable in this
situation. That law was stated in our early case o f Osborn v. Ark. Territorial Oil &
Gas Co., 103 Ark. 175, 146 S.W. 122 (1912):
Petroleum, gas and oil are substances o f a peculiar character * * *.
They belong to the owner o f land, and are part o f it so long as they are
part o f it or in it or subject to his control; but when they escape and
go into other land or come under another's control, the title o f the
former owner is gone. If an adjoining owner drills his own land and
taps a deposit o f oil or gas extending under his neighbor's field, so that
it comes into his well, it becomes his property.
[Quoting Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 15 S.Ct. 245, 39 L.Ed. 304 (1895).]
Later cases are to the same effect.
The Arkansas Supreme Court thus concluded “that the law o f capture prevents the [plaintiff]
from maintaining his first asserted cause o f action” for minerals drained from his land lying adjacent
to, but outside of, the periphery o f Ethyl's recycling area.
The second reported “brine drainage” case was a diversity case decided by the Eighth Circuit
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Court o f Appeals, Young v. Ethyl Corporation.34 Young sued Ethyl for damages it allegedly caused
as a result o f its recycling operations. In contrast to Budd’s land, Young’s land was situated in the
recycling area, directly between Ethyl's injection and production wells.
Specifically, Ethyl operated two production wells adjacent to the north and east o f the
Young’s land, a production well located immediately to the north and west o f Young’s land, and an
injection well located adjacent to and south o f Young’s land. It was undisputed that the injection
o f debrominated waters into the injection well south o f Young’s land recycled the brine in the
formation underlying Young’s land, forcing it to move to, and be recovered by, Ethyl’s production
wells located northeast and northwest o f Young’s land.
Relying on the decision o f the Arkansas Supreme Court in Budd. the District Court had held
that the rule o f capture precluded Young’s action against Ethyl. In reversing the district court's
decision, the Court o f Appeals held that there were significant factual distinctions between Budd and
Y oung. In distinguishing these two cases, the Court o f Appeals compared exactly where each
particular tract o f land was situated in relation to Ethyl's recycling area. The Court o f Appeals
distinguished the holding in Budd because Budd’s land was adjacent to, but outside of Ethyl's
recycling area, whereas Young’s land was located directly within Ethyl's recovery area. The court
stated:
In Budd. the plaintiff sought an accounting for bromides removed from beneath two
nonadjacent tracts o f land. The Arkansas Supreme Court treated the two tracts
separately, dismissing the cause o f action as to each tract for different reasons. The
first tract considered by the court was a 240-acre tract in which Budd owned an
undivided interest in the minerals. The court found that this 240-acre tract was
outside o f the recycling area, although adjacent to it. Relying on the rule o f capture,
the court rejected Budd's contention that the drainage o f valuable minerals from
34521 F.2d 771 at 772, 773 (8th Cir. 1975).
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beneath the tract stated a cause of action....
Since Young's tract is within the recycling area, the state court's disposition o f Budd's
cause o f action with respect to the 240-acre tract is not controlling.35
The Eighth Circuit Court o f Appeals in Young thus took great pains to preserve the holding
o f the Budd decision.

The court made it clear that its decision only applied to those lands that lie

within the recycling area, i. e., the area between the injection and production wells.
The third reported “brine drainage” case is the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Jameson
v. Ethyl Corporation.36 Ethyl had sued Jameson for declaratory judgment, seeking to establish the
legality o f its operations pursuant to the rule o f capture. Jameson counterclaimed for damages and
requested injunctive restraint o f Ethyl's operations. Jameson's land was located within the area
between Ethyl's injection wells and production wells. Ruling that the Arkansas Supreme Court's
decision in Budd expressed the controlling law, the chancery court determined that the rule o f capture
was applicable to Ethyl's operations and, accordingly, dismissed Mrs. Jameson's counterclaim.
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the Budd decision was inapplicable to the
facts presented by Mrs. Jameson. The court stated:
In Budd v. Ethyl Corporation, supra, this Court had occasion to address the issue o f
whether Ethyl's operations in the Field which forcibly injected brine into input
(injection) wells were entitled to the benefit o f the rule o f capture. As to a 240-acre
tract lying next to but outside o f Ethyl's 15,000 area block, this Court held that the
rule o f capture applied and that Ethyl was not obligated to account for any minerals
which may have flowed as a result thereof into its wells from the 240-acre tract.
However, as to a 40-acre tract lying within Ethyl's peripheral area o f input (injection)
wells, this Court concluded that a separate analysis was necessary. Because o f the
limited nature o f the lessee's interest in the 40-acre tract within Ethyl's peripheral area
of input wells and certain equities noted, this Court also rejected Budd's claim against

35Young v. Ethyl Corporation, supra , at 772-73 (emphasis added).
36271 Ark. 621, 609 S.W.2d 346 (1980).
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Ethyl concerning the 40-acre tract. Obviously, this Court would not have treated the
encircled 40-acre tract differently if this Court had reached the decision in the Budd
case that it was immaterial whether the lands were inside or outside o f Ethyl's
peripheral area o f input wells.37
Thus, the Jameson decision preserved the holding in Budd that the rule o f capture precluded recovery
for alleged injury to lands lying next to, but outside of \ the recycling area.
The District Court denied Great Lakes' motion for partial summary judgment limiting Deltic's
recovery to damages suffered by Deltic on lands within the recycling area defined by Great Lakes'
consulting engineer in his affidavit. The Court agreed with Deltic that the extent o f the actionable
area was a question o f fact to be determined from the evidence. The matter is under advisement.

Is an AOGC Order Form ing a Prod uction Uni t a Re s J u d ic a t a
Bar to an Act io n f or Inj ur y to Lan ds Outside the Un i t ?
Deltic claimed that Great Lakes' operations have damaged its lands even lying outside Great
Lakes' units. Copies of the orders of the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission, finding specifically that
Great Lakes' operations are contained within those units were offered into evidence at the trial.
Indeed, the order which formed the West Plant Unit expressly rejected Deltic's request to include
additional lands within that unit, finding that those lands had not been affected and were not in
imminent danger of being affected in the future. Under Arkansas law those unitization orders can be

res judicata bars to similar claims.38
The District Court refused to bar such Deltic claims on the basis o f res judicata , but, when
Deltic failed to produce evidence o f any such injury, the matter became moot.

37Jameson v. Ethyl, supra . 271 Ark. at 627-28 (emphasis added).
38Katter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 765 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1985).
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Wha t is t h e Pr o pe r M ea sur e of Da m a ge s for Wil lf u l M ine ra l Tr e s pa s s ?
Young v. Ethyl was the subject o f two appeals to the Eighth Circuit. The first, discussed
above, dealt with Ethyl's liability to Young. Upon remand o f the Young case, the District Court
assessed damages. In so doing, the District Court found that Ethyl had relied in good faith upon its
belief that the rule o f capture protected it from liability. As a consequence, the District Court held
that Ethyl had committed a trespass upon Young's land, but that that trespass was an innocent
trespass, as opposed to a bad faith trespass. The District Court then proceeded to erroneously award
to Young the value o f all o f the products which Ethyl had produced from the bromine within the brine
removed from Young's land.
The Eighth Circuit Court o f Appeals reversed again.39 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the
District Court's holding that Ethyl's trespass was not in bad faith. However, it reversed the District
Court's ruling that damages should be based upon bromine and secondary and tertiary bromine
products. Instead, the Court o f Appeals specifically held that brine is a mineral under Arkansas law
and that the measure o f damages for a good faith trespass to brine must be based upon the value o f
the brine in the ground. The value of brine in the ground can be measured either by taking their value
at the well head and subtracting the costs of extracting them or, if the court determines that the victim
o f the trespass would not have been a participant in the well, then a fair royalty.
Great Lakes contends that it acted in good faith. Deltic disputes that contention. All parties
do appear to agree that the rule o f Young v. Ethyl discussed above sets the measure o f damages if
the court finds Great Lakes to have acted in good faith. However, if Great Lakes is found to have
acted in bad faith, Deltic contends that it is entitled to damages based upon the value o f elemental
39Young v. Ethyl, 581 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1978).
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bromine rather than brine at the well head. Great Lakes, on the other hand, argues that even bad faith
damages should be limited to those based upon the well head value o f brine without allowance for
the cost o f bringing the brine to the well head.
Great Lakes’ legal argument in this regard is based upon the following excerpt from the Eighth
Circuit’s second Young opinion:
National Land and Arkansas Supreme Court cases indicate that if the taking is willful
and in bad faith the measure o f damages if the value at the well head without
deducting any costs o f bringing the mineral to the surface. Thus even under the bad
faith rule using the maximum surface value o f five cents per barrel, the total damages
would approximate $380,000.40
Deltic contends that the above-quoted language was dicta because the Young appeal had
involved a good faith trespass. The District Court denied Great Lakes' motion for partial summary
judgment on this issue. The actual amount o f damages, if any, is under advisement.
Deltic also contended that it was entitled to recover punitive damages in addition to bad faith
damages. The trial court did grant Great Lakes' motion for partial summary judgment on that issue,
holding that bad faith trespass damages were a form o f punitive damages which precluded an award
o f additional punitive damages.

"Id. at 719.
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